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1. Introduction
1.1. Context
Trust and security management in distributed frameworks is known to be a non-trivial critical 
issue. It is particularly challenging in Service Oriented Architecture where services can be discovered 
and composed in a dynamic way. Implemented solutions should meet the seemingly antinomic goals 
of openness and flexibility on one hand and compliance with data privacy and other regulations on 
the other hand. We have demonstrated in previous works (Chevalier et al., 2008, 2012; Avanesov et 
al., 2012a) that functional agility can be achieved for services with a message-level security policy by 
providing an automated service synthesis algorithm. It resolves a system of deducibility constraints 
by synthesizing a mediator that may adapt, compose and analyze messages exchanged between client 
services and having the functionalities specified by a goal service. It is complete as long as the 
security policies only apply to the participants in the orchestration and not on the synthesized 
service nor on who is able to participate. However security policies often include such non-
deducibility constraints on the mediator. For instance an organization may not be trusted to efficiently 
protect the customer’s data against attackers even though it is well-meaning. In this case a client 
would require that the mediator synthesized to interact with this organization must not have direct 
access to her private data, which is an effective protection even in case of total compromise. Also it 
is not possible to specify that the mediator enforces e.g. dynamic separation of duty, i.e., restrictions 
on the possible participants based on the messages exchanged.
Since checking whether a solution computed by our previous algorithm satisfies the non-
deducibility constraints is not complete, we propose in this paper to solve during the automated 
synthesis of the mediator both deducibility and non-deducibility constraints. The former are em-
ployed to specify a mediator that satisfies the functional requirements and the security policy on the 
messages exchanged by the participants whereas the latter are employed to enforce a security policy 
on the mediator and the participants to the orchestration.
1.1.1. Original contribution
We have previously proposed some decision procedures (Chevalier et al., 2008, 2012; Avanesov et 
al., 2012a; AVANTSSAR, 2008–2010; NESSoS, 2010–2014) for generating a mediator from a high-level 
specification with deducibility constraints of a goal service. In this paper, we extend the formalism to 
include non-deducibility constraints in the specification of the mediator. Then we provide a deci-sion 
procedure for the resulting class of constraint systems and therefore solve the mediator synthesis 
problem in this setting. This paper extends the previous publication (Avanesov et al., 2012b) in 
several aspects: the proofs are reorganized and improved; all omitted reasonings are included; the 
details on the implementation of the decision procedure for Dolev Yao theory within the Cl-Atse tool 
are given; and the experimental results for a Loan Origination Process case study with and without 
non-deducibility constraints are analyzed.
1.1.2. Related works
In order to understand and anticipate potential flaws in complex composition scenarios, several 
approaches have been proposed for the formal specification and analysis of secure services (Armando 
et al., 2012; Costa et al., 2011; Armando and Ponta, 2014; Armando et al., 2013; Viganò, 2012, 2013). 
Among the works dedicated to trust in multi-agent systems, the models closest to ours are Herzig et 
al. (2010), Lorini and Demolombe (2008) in which one can express that an agent trusts another agent 
in doing or forbearing of doing an action that leads to some goal. To our knowledge no work has 
pre-viously considered the automatic orchestration of security services with policies altogether as 
ours. 
However there are some interesting related attempts to analyze security protocols and trust man-
agement (Martinelli, 2005; Frau and Dashti, 2011). In Martinelli (2005) the author uniformly models 
security protocols and access control based on trust management. The work introduces an elegant 
approach to model automated trust negotiation. We also consider an integrated framework for proto-
cols and policies but in our case i) policies can be explicitly negative such as non-disclosure policies 
and separation-of-duty ii) we propose a decision procedure for the related trust negotiation problem 
iii) we do not consider indistinguishability properties. In Frau and Dashti (2011) security protocols
are combined with authorization logics that can be expressed with acyclic Horn clauses. The authors
encode the derivation of authorization predicates (for a service) as subprotocols and can reuse in that
way the constraint solving algorithm from Millen and Shmatikov (2001), Comon-Lundh et al. (2010)
to obtain a decision procedure. In our case we consider more general intruder theories (subterm con-
vergent ones) but focus on negation. We conjecture that our approach applies to their authorization
policies too.
Our decision procedure for general (negative and positive) constraints extends (Corin et al., 2006)
where negative constraints are limited to have ground terms in right-hand sides, and the deduction 
system is the Dolev-Yao system (Dolev and Yao, 1983), a special instance of the subterm deduction 
systems we consider here. In Kähler et al. (2007) the authors study a class of contract signing pro-
tocols where some very specific Dolev-Yao negative constraints are implicitly handled (in particular 
only Dolev-Yao standard case is considered).
Finally one should note that the non-deducibility constraints we consider tell that some data can-
not be disclosed globally but they cannot express finer-grained privacy or information leakage notions 
relying on probability such as for instance differential privacy.
1.1.3. Paper organization
In Section 2 we give motivating examples. In Subsection 2.1 we introduce a banking application 
and sketch our approach to obtain a mediator service. To our knowledge this application is out of the 
scope of alternative automatic methods.
In Section 3 we present our formal setting. A deduction system (Subsection 3.2) describes the 
abilities of the mediator to process the messages. The mediator synthesis problem is reduced to the 
resolution of constraints that are defined in Subsection 3. In Section 4 we recall the class of subterm 
deduction systems and their properties. These systems have nice properties that allow us to decide 
in Section 5 the satisfiability of deducibility constraints even with negation. Finally we conclude in 
Section 7.
2. Motivating examples
2.1. Synthesis of a loan origination process (LOP)
We illustrate how negative constraints are needed to express elaborated policies such as Separation 
of Duty by a classical loan origination process example. Our goal is to synthesize a mediator that 
selects two bank clerks satisfying the Separation of Duty policy to manage the client request. Such 
a problem is solved automatically by the decision procedure proved in the following sections. Let us 
walk through the specification of the different parts of the orchestration problem.
2.1.1. Formal setting
Data are represented by first-order terms defined on a signature that comprises binary symbols 
for symmetric and asymmetric encryptions (resp. {|_|}_ , {_}_), signature ({_}
sig
_ ), and pairing (pair). 
Given a public key k we write inv (k) its associated private key. For example {a}
sig
inv(k)
is the signature 
of a by the owner of the pair of public and private keys k, inv (k). For readability we write a.b.c a 
term pair (a,pair (b, c)). The construction rel(_, _) expresses that two agents are related and is used 
for defining a Separation of Duty policy. A unary symbol g is employed to designate the participants’ 
identity in the “relatives” database.
A set of possible operations on data (represented by terms) is expressed in a form of so-called 
deduction rules shown in Fig. 1. These are split into two categories, composition and decomposition 
Composition rules Decomposition rules
x, y → pair (x, y) pair (x, y) → x
pair (x, y) → y
x, y → {|x|}y y, {|x|}y → x
x, y → {x}y inv (y) , {x}y → x
x, inv (y) → {x}
sig
inv(y)
y, {x}
sig
inv(y)
→ x
x, rel(x, y) → y
y, rel(x, y) → x
Fig. 1. Deduction system for the LOP example.
Clerk’s (A) communications:
∗ ⇒ A : request.M
A ⇒ M : g(A).pk(A)
M ⇒ A : {Amnt.C .K }pk(A)
A ⇒ M : {h(A.Amnt.C .RespA)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{RespA}K
Non-disclosure policy:
(1) M cannot deduce the fourth message before it is sent by A.
(2) M cannot deduce identity of the clerk (i.e. g(A)) before it is sent by A (done in the second message).
Fig. 2. Clerk’s communications and non-disclosure constraints.
rules. The former are used to ”compose” more complex term from simpler pieces while the latter play 
the inverse role of extracting a piece from a composed term. Everything that an agent can compute 
is deducible through this system from his initial knowledge plus the fresh data he generated (nonces) 
and the messages he received from external entities. As formally defined later in Section 3 this gives 
life to derivations, i.e. sequences of ground deduction rules augmented with nonce generations and 
message receptions, where any term in the left-hand side of a rule is somewhere in the right-hand 
sides of previous rules. A derivation shows exactly which data an agent chooses to compute (among 
the infinite ones) and how he do it. The deduction capabilities defined here matches the so-called 
Dolev-Yao model with non-atomic keys, slightly augmented with two rules for rel.
2.1.2. Client and clerks
The client and the clerks are specified by services with a security policy, specifying the crypto-
graphic protections and the data and security tokens, and a business logic that specifies the sequence 
in which the operations may be invoked. These are compiled into a sequence of protected messages 
each service is willing to follow, as in Fig. 2 and 3 for the clerk and the client, and following the Alice-
Bob notation. Within this notation, A ⇒ B: M is one protocol step, run after those above and before 
those under, where agent A sends the message M to agent B . When an agent name is unknown or 
irrelevant, ∗ is used instead. For consistency, an agent can only send messages that he knows or can 
create, and any run of the protocol will be described by a derivation showing the communications 
with agents in the exact same order as in each agent’s specification.
Client C wants to ask for a loan from a service P , but for this he needs to get an approval from two 
banking clerks. He declares his intention by signing and sending to mediator M a message containing 
service name P and the identity of the client g(C). The mediator should send back the names of 
two clerks A and B who will evaluate his request. The client then sends to each clerk a request 
containing amount Amnt, his name C and a fresh key Nk which should be used to encrypt decisions. 
Each request is encrypted with a public key of the corresponding clerk (pk(A) or pk(B)). Then the 
mediator must furnish the decisions (Ra and Rb) of the two clerks, each encrypted with the proposed 
key Nk and accompanied by their signatures. Finally, the client uses these tokens to ask for his loan 
from P , where pk(P ) is a public key of P .
A clerk receives a request to participate in a LOP which is conducted by the mediator M . If he 
accepts, he returns his identity and public key. Then he receives the client’s request containing data 
to process to evaluate the loan: the amount Amnt, the client’s name C and a temporary key K to 
Client’s (C) communications:
C ⇒ M : {g(C).loan.P }
sig
inv(pk(C))
M ⇒ C : A.B
C ⇒ M : {Amnt.C .Nk}pk(A).{Amnt.C .Nk}pk(B)
M ⇒ C : {h(A.Amnt.C .Ra)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C .Rb)}
sig
inv(pk(B))
.{|Rb |}Nk
C ⇒ P : {Amnt.C .A.Ra.B.Rb}pk(P ) . {h(A.Amnt.C .Ra)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C .Rb)}
sig
inv(pk(B))
.{|Rb |}Nk
Non-disclosure policy:
(1) M cannot deduce the amount Amnt.
(2) M cannot deduce A’s decision Ra .
(3) M cannot deduce B ’s decision Rb .
Fig. 3. Client’s Communications and non-disclosure constraints.
encrypt his decision. That decision is sent back together with a signature certifying its authenticity in 
relation to the given request.
The client’s non-disclosure policy is given in Fig. 3 and is self-explanatory. Let us explain the 
services’ non-disclosure policy. The clerk’s decision (its last message) should be unforgeable, thus, it 
should not be known by the Mediator before it was sent by the clerk (first non-disclosure constraint 
of Fig. 2). The second non-disclosure constraint of Fig. 2 expresses that the clerk A can be used by 
the mediator only if the constraint ♮g(A) is satisfied, i.e., that A is not a relative with any other actor 
of the protocol, as either the client or the other clerk.
2.1.3. Goal service
In contrast with the other services and clients, the goal service is only described in terms of 
possible operations and available initial data.
Initial data. Beside his private/public keys and the public keys of potential partners (e.g. pk (P )) the 
goal service has access to a relational database denoted rel(g(a), g(c)), rel(g(b), g(c)), . . .
for storing known existing relations between agents to be checked against conflict of inter-
ests.
Deduction rules. The access to the database as well as the possible operations on messages are mod-
eled by a set of deduction rules (formally defined later). We anticipate on the rest of this 
paper, and present the rules specific to this case study grouped into composition and de-
composition rules in Fig. 1.
2.1.4. Mediator synthesis problem
In order to communicate with the services (here the client, the clerks and the service P ), a 
mediator has to satisfy a sequence of constraints expressing that (i) each message m expected by 
a service (denoted ?m) can be deduced from all the previously sent messages m′ (denoted !m′) 
and the initial knowledge, and (ii) each message w that should not be known or disclosed by the 
mediator (denoted ♮w and called negative constraint) is not deducible at that point in the pro-
cess.
The orchestration problem consists in finding a satisfying interleaving of the constraints imposed 
by each service. Since the mediator has a central position in the message exchanges, we can safely 
assume that all the messages goes through him. That is, each time A sends a message to B , he 
send it to the mediator M instead who will forward it to B . If needed the identity of B can be 
paired with the message to make it clear to M . One could argue that this simplification increases 
the knowledge of the mediator and thus, limits the solutions to the negative constraints. However, 
this is fine because a malicious mediator could anyway listen to and change these messages (e.g. 
man-in-the-middle attack), and thus, they must be counted as knowledges for the negative constraints 
even if not officially going through the mediator. For instance, the clerk’s and the client’s constraints 
extracted from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are:


Client(C)
1
= ! {g(C).loan.P }
sig
inv(KC )
?A.B
!{Amnt.C .Nk}pk(A) . {Amnt.C .Nk}pk(B)
? {h(A.Amnt.C .Ra)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C .Rb)}
sig
inv(pk(B))
.{|Rb|}Nk
♮Amnt ♮R A ♮RB
! {Amnt.C .A.Ra.B.Rb}pk(P ) . {h(A.Amnt.C .Ra)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C .Rb)}
sig
inv(pk(B))
.{|Rb|}Nk
Clerk(A)
1
= ?request.M ♮g(A) !g(A).pk (A) ? {Amnt.C .K }pk(A)
♮ {h(A.Amnt.C .RespA)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{|RespA |}K
! {h(A.Amnt.C .RespA)}
sig
inv(pk(A))
.{|RespA |}K
Here, each client’s or clerk’s list of constraints consists in a sequence of actions or assumptions 
presented in the order in which they must be performed or validated. For example, ?A.B in Client(C)
means that C must receive a pair of clerk’s names A.B from the mediator somewhere after sending 
his first message (declaration of intention) and before sending his second (requests to each clerk). 
Similarly, ♮Amnt in Client(C) says that C cannot continue to run in the protocol past this point if 
the mediator knows or can deduce Amnt. Each interleaving of these constraints preserving the partial 
orderings plus some sanity properties (origination, determination) shown in Section 3 is called a 
constraint system, and consists in a single sequence of constraints for the client and the clerks fused 
together and communicating with the mediator. A solution to a constraint system is a derivation for 
the mediator showing that he can validate all the constraints in the system in sequence, i.e. with the 
same ordering he i) can create any message t expected by an agent (?t) from his initial knowledge 
plus the nonces he generated (fresh data) and the messages sent to him earlier in the derivation; 
ii) cannot create any message t in a negative constraint (♮t) from his knowledge plus the nonces he
generated and the messages sent to him earlier in the derivation. Since any constraint system has the
same length as the orchestration problem from which it is derived, and since we target an NP decision
procedure for building a solution (derivation) to that problem, we assume for simplicity in the rest of
this paper that a single ordering has been chosen already, and thus, that only one constraint system
needs to be checked. The result can then be trivially lifted to finding a solution for an orchestration
problem by guessing together one constraint system (same length) and one derivation (bounded by
some fixed and known polynom), and then checking at the same time if the constraint system is
a satisfiable ordering of the orchestration problem and if the derivation is indeed a solution to it.
A solution produced by our procedure can then be translated automatically into a mediator (the
derivation is complete). An example of this is shown in Section 6.3. Note, for example, that without
the negative constraint ♮g(A) a synthesized mediator might accept any clerk identity and that could
violate the Separation of Duty policy.
2.2. Expressing role based access control mechanisms
We show now how our service synthesis method can accommodate constraints derived from Role 
Based Access Control policies (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). Role Based Access Control (RBAC in short) 
has been introduced in organizations to simplify the management of individual user rights. Users can 
be assigned some roles, and through these roles obtain permissions to perform various operations. For 
illustration purpose we present below some RBAC policies and their encoding.
Let us first give some notations:
• atomic permission: a1(X), . . . , ak(X), where ai represents a permission and X is an agent, i.e.
a1(b) stands for “agent b has a permission a1”
1;
1 The notation can be extended to take into account objects in order to express policies like “agent b has permission a1 on 
object c”.
• role: A role is represented by a function symbol that, for the purpose of RBAC modelling, is
applied on the set of atomic permissions and a set of inherited roles, also modelled by similar
terms;
• role hierarchy: Roles can be hierarchically organized. Higher-level roles inherit permissions owned
by sub-roles. For example, a “project leader” role subsumes a “programmer” role, since all atomic
permissions of the “programmer” role are inherited by the “project leader” role.
Assume that a “project leader” role is assigned to some agent X . This will be represented by the
following term where the root symbol is the highest role of X in the hierarchy and its arguments 
list contains the specific permissions given to a“project leader” (e.g. can_ f ire_programmer) and the 
sub-roles inherited from the hierarchy (here programmer):
Rleader(can_ f ire_programmer(X), R programmer(can_commit(X)))
We add to the current deduction rules of Fig. 1 some extra rules Rleader(X1, X2) → Xi , for i ∈ {1,2}
and R programmer(Y ) → Y . These rules encode the possibility to obtain all available atomic permissions 
from a role, as well as all permissions from sub-roles of the hierarchy.
To be able to assign a project leader role to an agent, the following agent’s actions may be used:
?X !Rleader(can_ f ire_programmer(X), can_commit(X), R programmer(can_commit(X)))
2.2.1. Delegation of rights
A simple pair of receive-send actions may be used to specify a delegation, where Agent X delegates 
to Agent Y a right a1 that X has:
?X .Y .a1(X) !deleg(X, Y ,a1(X),a1(Y ))
An extra deduction rule is required too: deleg(X, Y , Z , T ) → T .2 Once the right is delegated, this 
rule permits to infer that right.
Note that a simplified encoding of the right delegation property ?X .Y .a1(X) !a1(Y ) that avoids 
using deleg symbol does not permit one to forbid a delegation at some point using the ♮ policy; 
however with deleg symbol it is possible: ♮deleg(X, Y , a1(X), a1(Y )) ensures that the agent X has not 
delegated right a1 to agent Y (see also § 2.2.4).
2.2.2. Separation of roles
This policy specifies that an agent cannot play two specific roles. To express such a policy in a 
service composition we simply append at the end:
♮(R¯clerk(X).R¯client(X))
That is, R¯clerk(X) and R¯client(X) are not known at the same time, meaning that X does not play clerk 
and client roles in parallel.
2.2.3. Separation of duties
This policy specifies that an agent cannot have two specific permissions at the same time. To 
express such a policy we simply add:
♮(a(X).b(X))
2.2.4. Delegation restriction
An agent A can be forbidden to delegate some right a. To express such a policy in a service 
composition we simply add:
♮(a(A).deleg(A, X,a(A),a(X)))
2 We might also add X, Y , Z to the right hand side, but these values are supposed to be known.
3. Derivations and constraint systems
In our setting, messages are terms generated or obtained according to some elementary rules 
called deduction rules. A derivation is a sequence of deduction rules applied by a mediator to build 
new messages. The goal of the synthesis is specified by a constraint system, i.e. a sequence of terms 
labelled by symbols !, ? or ♮, respectively sent, received, or unknown at some step of the process.
3.1. Terms and substitutions
Let X be a set of variables, F be a set of function symbols and C be a set of constants. The set of 
terms T is the minimal set containing X , C and if t1, . . . , tk ∈ T then f (t1, . . . , tk) ∈ T for any f ∈F
with arity k. The set of subterms of a term t is denoted Sub(t) and is the minimal set containing t such 
that f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Sub(t) implies t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(t) for f ∈F . We denote Vars (t) the set X ∩ Sub(t). 
A term t is ground is Vars (t)= ∅. We denote Tg the set of ground terms.
A substitution σ is an idempotent mapping from X to T . The application of a substitution σ
on a term t is denoted tσ and is equal to the term t where each variable x has been replaced 
by the term xσ . The domain of σ (denoted by dom (σ )) is set: {x ∈X : xσ 6= x}. The image of σ is 
img (σ )= {xσ : x ∈ dom (σ )}. A substitution σ is ground if img (σ )⊆ Tg . We say that a substitution σ
is injective on a set of terms T , iff for all p, q ∈ T pσ = qσ implies p = q. Given two substitutions σ , δ, 
the substitution σ δ has for domain dom (σ ) ∪ dom (δ) and is defined by xσ δ = (xσ )δ. If dom (σ ) ∩
dom (δ)= ∅ we write σ ∪ δ instead of σ δ.
A unification system U is a finite set of equations {pi =? qi}1≤i≤n where pi, qi ∈ T . A substitution σ
is a unifier of U or equivalently satisfies U iff for all i = 1, . . . , n, piσ = qiσ . Any satisfiable unification 
system U admits a most general unifier mgu (U ), unique modulo variable renaming, and such that for 
any unifier σ of U there exists a substitution τ such that σ =mgu (U )τ . We assume in the rest of 
this paper that Vars (img (mgu (U )))⊆ Vars (U ), i.e., the most general unifier does not introduce new 
variables.
A sequence s is indexed by [1, . . . , n] with n ∈ N. We write |s| the length of s, ∅ the empty se-
quence, s[i] the i-th element of s, s[m : n] the sequence s[m], . . . , s[n] and s, s′ the concatenation of 
two sequences s and s′ . We write e ∈ s and E ⊆ s instead of, respectively, there exists i such that 
s[i] = e and for all e ∈ E we have e ∈ s.
While not explicited, the size of any object is assumed to be linear (with some fixed coef.) in the 
DAG-size of the set of it’s elements.
3.2. Deduction systems
The new values created by the mediator are constants in a subset Cmed of C . We assume that both 
Cmed and C \ Cmed are infinite. Given l1, . . . , ln, r ∈ T , the notation l1, . . . , ln → r denotes a deduction 
rule if Var(r) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Var(li). A deduction is a ground instance of a deduction rule. A deduction system
is a set of deduction rules that contains a finite set of deduction rules in addition to all nonce creation 
rules → n (one for every n ∈ Cmed) and all reception rules ?t (one for every t ∈ T ). All rules but the 
reception rules are called standard rules. The deduction system describes the abilities of the mediator 
to process the messages. In the rest of this section we fix an arbitrary deduction system D. We denote 
by l ∗→ r any rule and l → r any standard rule.
3.3. Derivations and localizations
A derivation is a sequence of deductions, including receptions of messages from available services, 
performed by the mediator. Given a sequence of deductions E = (li ∗→ ri)i=1,...,m we denote RE (i) the 
set 
{
r j : j ≤ i
}
.
Definition 3.1 (Derivation). A sequence of deductions D = (li ∗→ ri)i=1,...,m is a derivation if for any 
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, li ⊆ RD(i − 1).
Fig. 4. A constraint system and a compliant derivation.
Given a derivation D we define NextD(i) =min({|D| + 1} ∪ { j : j > i and D[ j] =?t j}). The explicit 
knowledge of the mediator is the set of terms it has already deduced, and its implicit knowledge is 
the set of terms it can deduce. If the former is K we denote the latter Der(K ). A derivation D is a 
proof of t ∈ Der(K ) if ?r ∈ D implies r ∈ K , and D[|D|] = l ∗→ t . Thus, we have:
Der(K )= {t : ∃D derivation s.t. ?r ∈ D implies r ∈ K , and D[|D|] = l→ t}
3.4. Constraint systems
Definition 3.2 (Constraint system). A constraint system S is a sequence of constraints where each con-
straint has one of three forms (where t is a term):
(1) ?t , denoting a message reception by an available service or a client,
(2) !t , denoting a message emission by an available service or a client,
(3) ♮t , a negative constraint, denoting that the mediator must not be able to deduce t at this point;
and that satisfies the following properties for any 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|:
Origination: if S[i] =!ti then Vars (ti)⊆
⋃
j<i Vars
({
t j : S[ j] =?t j
})
;
Determination: if S[i] = ♮ti then Vars (ti)⊆
⋃
j Vars
({
t j : S[ j] =?t j
})
.
Origination means that every unknown in a service’s state originates from previous input by the 
mediator. Determination means that negative constraints are on messages determined by a service’s 
state at the end of its execution.
In the rest of this paper, S (and decorations thereof) denotes a constraint system. An index i is a 
send (resp. a receive) index if S[i] =!t (resp. S[i] =?t) for some term t . If i1, . . . , ik is the sequence of 
all send (resp. receive) indices in S we denote Out(S) (resp. In(S)) the sequence S[i1], . . . , S[ik]. We 
note that the origination and determination properties imply Var(S) = Var(In(S)). Given 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|
we denote prevS (i) to be max({0} ∪
{
j : j ≤ i and S[ j] =!t j
}
).
Definition 3.3 (Solution of a constraint system). A ground substitution σ is a solution of S , and we 
denote σ |= S , if dom (σ )= Var(S) and
(1) if S[i] =?t then tσ ∈ Der(
{
t jσ : j ≤ prevS (i) and S[ j] =!t j
}
)
(2) if S[i] = ♮t then tσ /∈ Der(
{
t jσ : j ≤ prevS (i) and S[ j] =!t j
}
).
Definition 3.4 (Compliant derivations). Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ )= Var(S). A deriva-
tion D is (S, σ )-compliant if there exists a strictly increasing bijective mapping α from the send 
indices of S to the set { j : D[ j] =?r} such that S[i] =!t implies D[α(i)] =?tσ .
An example of (S, σ )-compliant derivation is shown in Fig. 4. Since a sequence of receptions is a 
derivation, we note that for every ground substitution σ with dom (σ ) = Var(In(S)) there exists at 
least one compliant derivation D .
Definition 3.5 (Proof of a solution). Let σ be a ground substitution. A derivation D is a proof of σ |= S , 
and we denote D, σ , α ⊢ S , if:
(1) D is (S, σ )-compliant with the mapping α and
(2) if S[i] =?t there is j < NextD(α(prevS (i))) such that D[i] = l ∗→ tσ and
(3) if S[i] = ♮t then tσ /∈ Der(
{
t jσ : j ≤ prevS (i) and S[ j] =!t j
}
).
In Fig. 4, if σ is a solution of S and, for example, t1σ = r2 , t2σ /∈ Der(∅), t4σ = r4 , t6σ /∈
Der({r3, r6}) and t7σ = r8 then D is a proof of σ |= S .
A technical subtility induced by the negative constraints is that it is easier to work on derivations 
that are not necessarily solutions of the constraint system and prove that if the constraint system is 
satisfiable one of these derivations is among its proofs. Accordingly, we define maximal derivations 
with regard to a set of terms T and a substitution σ as a derivation in which every subterm of T
whose σ -instance is deducible is deduced as soon as possible (Definition 3.6). Then we prove that if a 
derivation D is (T , σ )-maximal and (T ′, σ ′) extends in a natural way (T , σ ) then D can be extended 
into a (T ′, σ ′)-maximal derivation (Lemma 2). This lemma can be applied on any (S, σ ) compliant 
derivation to obtain a (S, σ ) compliant (Sub(S), σ ) maximal derivation. Such derivations are proofs 
of σ |= S if σ satisfies S (Lemma 1).
Definition 3.6 (Maximal derivation). Let T be a finite set of terms and σ be a ground substitution 
with dom (σ )= Var(T ). A derivation D is (T , σ )-maximal if for every t ∈ Sub(T ), tσ ∈ Der(RD(i)) iff 
tσ ∈ RD(NextD(i) − 1).
First we prove that maximal derivations are natural proof candidates of σ |= S by showing that 
whether an individual constraint is satisfied by a substitution σ can be read on a maximal compliant 
derivation.
Lemma 1. Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ ) = Var(S) and D be a (S, σ )-compliant
(Sub(S), σ )-maximal derivation. Then σ |= S iff for all i
• if S[i] =?t then there exists j <NextD(α(prevS (i))) : D[ j] = l ∗→ tσ and
• if S[i] = ♮t then for all j < NextD(α(prevS (i))) : D[ j] 6= l ∗→ tσ .
In the next lemma we show that any (T , σ )-maximal derivation D may be extended into a 
(T ′, σ ′)-maximal derivation for an arbitrary extension T ′, σ ′ of T , σ by adding into D only standard 
deductions.
Lemma 2. Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ )= Var(S). Let T1, T2 be two sets of terms such that 
T1 ⊆ T2 , and σ1, σ2 be two substitutions such that dom (σ1)= Var(T1) and dom (σ2)= Var(T2) \ Var(T1). 
If D is a (T1, σ1)-maximal (S, σ )-compliant derivation in which no term is deduced twice by a standard rule, 
then there exists a (T2, σ1 ∪ σ2)-maximal (S, σ )-compliant derivation D
′ in which no term is deduced twice 
by a standard rule such that every deduction whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ1 occurs in D
′ iff it occurs 
in D.
Proof. Let i1, . . . , ik be the indices of the non-standard rules in D , let D[i j] =?ti j , and let for 0 ≤ j ≤ k
D j = D[i j + 1 : i j+1 − 1] with i0 = 0 and ik+1 = |D| + 1. That is, D = D0, ?ti1 , D1, ?ti2 , D2, . . .?tik , Dk . 
Noting that dom (σ1)∩ dom (σ2)= ∅ let σ
′ = σ1 ∪ σ2 .
For each t ∈ Sub(T2) such that tσ
′ ∈ Der(ti1 , . . . , tik ) let it be minimal such that tσ
′ ∈
Der(ti1 , . . . , tit ), and let E
0
t be a proof of this fact, and Et be a sequence of standard deductions 
obtained by removing every non-standard deduction from E0t .
For 0 ≤ j ≤ k let D ′j be the sequence of standard deduction steps D j, Es1 , . . . , Esp for all sm ∈
Sub(T2)σ
′ \ Sub(T1)σ
′ such that ism = j in which every rule of Es1 , . . . , Esp that deduces a term 
previously deduced in the sequence or for some m ≤ j deduced in D ′m or in D[im] is removed.
Let D ′ = D ′0, ?ti1 , D
′
1, . . . , ?tik , D
′
k
. We have deleted in each E0t only deductions whose right-hand
side occurs before in D ′ , and thus D ′ is a derivation. Since the D ′i contains only standard deductions, 
we can see that D ′ is (S, σ )-compliant.
Since D is (T1, σ1)-maximal and no term is deduced twice in D we note that, for t ∈ T1 , no stan-
dard deduction of tσ1 from a sequence D j is deleted. Furthermore we note that standard deductions 
of terms in Sub(T2)σ2 that are also in Sub(T1)σ1 are deleted by construction and by the maximality 
of D . Thus a deduction whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ1 is in D
′ iff it occurs in D .
By construction D ′ is (T2, σ
′)-maximal and no term is deduced twice by standard deductions. ✷
Informally, the condition on the deductions whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ enforces that 
the constructed derivation D ′ is an extension of D with new deductions.
Taking T1 = ∅, T2 = Sub(S), and σ2 = σ , Lemma 2 implies that for every substitution σ of domain 
Var(S) there exists a (S, σ )-compliant (Sub(S), σ )-maximal derivation D . By Lemma 1 if σ |= S then 
D is a proof of σ |= S . Since the converse is trivial, it suffices to search proofs maximal with regard 
to T ⊇ Sub(S).
Lemma 3. If σ |= S then there exists a (S, σ )-compliant and (Sub(S), σ )-maximal derivation D and α such 
that D, σ , α ⊢ S .
4. Subterm deduction system
In this section we will prove some properties on derivations allowing us to show bounds on sets 
of terms from which the derivations’ messages are instantiated (Lemma 5 and 8). Moreover, we also 
introduce the notion of milestone sequences Definition 4.3, which are maximal sequences of con-
straints matching a derivation with “good” subterm properties. The purpose is to identify in Section 5
particular solutions to constraint systems which sizes are bounded by a fixed polynom that we can 
compute.
4.1. Definition and main property
We say that a deduction system is a subterm deduction system whenever each deduction rule which 
is not a nonce creation or a message reception is either:
(1) x1, . . . , xn → f (x1, . . . , xn) for a function symbol f ;
(2) l1, . . . , ln → r for some terms l1, . . . , ln, r such that r ∈
⋃n
i=1 Sub(li).
A composition rule is either a message reception, a nonce creation, or a rule of the first type. A de-
duction rule is otherwise a decomposition rule. In the rest of this paper we will usually also write 
(de)composition rule to denote a ground instance of one such rule. Reachability problems for deduc-
tion systems with a convergent equational theory are reducible to the satisfiability of a constraint 
system in the empty theory for a deduction system in our setting (Lynch and Meadows, 2005;
Kourjieh, 2009). If furthermore the equational theory is subterm (Baudet, 2005) the reduction is to 
a subterm deduction system as just defined above.
Now we show that if D, σ , α ⊢ S , a term s ∈ Sub(D) is either the instance of a non-variable 
subterm of Out(S) or deduced by a standard composition.
Lemma 4. Let σ be a ground substitution such that σ |= S . If D is a proof of σ |= S such that no term is 
deduced twice in D by standard rules and s is a term such that s ∈ Sub(D) and s /∈ (Sub(Out(S)) \X )σ then 
there exists an index i in D such that D[i] = l → s is a composition rule and s /∈ Sub(RD(i − 1)).
Proof. First we note that by definition of subterm deduction systems for any decomposition rule l → r
we have a) r ∈ Sub(l), and b) for any composition rule l → r we have l ⊂ Sub(r) and Sub(r) \ Sub(l) =
{r}.
Let D be a proof of σ |= S , and let i be minimal such that D[i] = lr ∗→ r with s ∈ Sub(r). Since 
lr ⊆ RD(i − 1), the minimality of i implies s ∈ Sub(r) \ Sub(lr).
Thus by a) D[i] cannot be a decomposition.
If D[i] =?r then by the (S, σ )-compliance of D we have S[α−1(i)] =!t with tσ = r and t ∈
Sub(Out(S)). We have s ∈ Sub(r) = Sub(tσ ) = (Sub(t) \ Vars (t))σ ∪ Sub(Vars (t)σ ).
If s ∈ (Sub(Out(S)) \X )σ we are done, otherwise there exists y ∈ Vars (t) with s ∈ Sub(yσ ). By the 
origination property, there exists k < α−1(i) such that S[k] =?t′ with y ∈ Vars
(
t′
)
. Since D, σ , α ⊢ S
and k < α−1(i) there exists j < i such that D[ j] = l j → t
′σ . The minimality of i is contradicted by 
s ∈ Sub(t′σ ).
Therefore, D[i] = lr → r is an instance of a standard composition rule. As a consequence, Sub(r) \
Sub(lr) = {r}. Since s ∈ Sub(r) \ Sub(lr), we finally obtain s = r. ✷
4.2. Locality
Subterm deduction systems are not necessarily local in the sense of McAllester (1993). However 
we prove in this subsection that given σ , there exists a finite extension T of Sub(S) and an extension 
σ ′ of σ of domain Var(T ) and a (T , σ ′)-maximal derivation D in which every deduction relevant 
to the proof of σ |= S is liftable into a deduction between terms in T . Let us first clarify the above 
statements.
Definition 4.1 (Localization set). A set of terms T localizes a derivation D = (li ∗→ ri)1≤i≤m for a sub-
stitution σ of domain Var(T ) if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m if D[i] is a standard rule and there exists 
t ∈ Sub(T ) \X such that tσ = ri , there exists t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(T ) such that {t1σ , . . . , tnσ } ⊆ RD(i − 1)
and t1, . . . , tn → t is the instance of a standard deduction rule.
First, we prove that for subterm deduction systems, every proof D of σ |= S is localized by a set 
T of DAG size linear in the DAG size of S . Note that the coefficient for this linearity is bounded by 
the size of the deduction system.
Lemma 5. If σ is a ground substitution such that σ |= S there exists T ⊇ Sub(S) of size bounded by v ×
|Sub(S)| (with v the size of the deduction system), a substitution τ of domain Var(T ) \ Var(S) and a (T , σ ∪
τ )-maximal and (S, σ )-compliant derivation localized by T for σ ∪ τ .
Proof. By Lemma 2 applied with T1 = ∅, T2 = Sub(S), σ1 = ∅, σ2 = σ , and D0 the (S, σ )-compliant 
derivation that has no standard deductions, there exists a (Sub(S), σ )-maximal (S, σ )-compliant 
derivation D in which no term is deduced twice by a standard deduction. From now on we let 
T0 = Sub(S).
Let {li → ri}1≤i≤n be the set of decompositions in D , and {(Li → R i,τi)}1≤i≤n be a set of decompo-
sition rules and ground substitutions such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Liτi → R iτi = li → ri . Since 
no term in D is deduced twice by a standard deduction, by Lemma 4 we have n ≤ |Sub(Out(S))|.
Modulo variable renaming we may assume that i 6= j implies dom (τi) ∩ dom
(
τ j
)
= ∅, and thus
that τ =
⋃n
i=1 τi is defined on T1 =
⋃n
i=1(Sub(Li) ∪ Sub(R i)). Note that the size of T1 is bounded by
M × |Sub(Out(S))|, where M is the maximal size of a decomposition rule belonging to the deduction 
system.
Let T = T0 ∪ T1 and, noting that these substitutions are defined on non-intersecting domains, let 
σ ′ = σ ∪ τ . By construction the size of T is bounded by (M + 1) × |Sub(S)|, and (M + 1) by the size 
of the deduction system (it has more than one rule).
By Lemma 2 there exists a (S, σ )-compliant derivation D ′ which is (T , σ ′)-maximal and such that 
each deduction of a term in T0σ that occurs in D also occurs in D
′ and no term is deduced twice in 
D ′ by a standard deduction.
Let l → r be a deduction in D ′ which does not appear in D . Since D is (T0, σ )-maximal we have 
r /∈ Sub(T0)σ , and thus r /∈ Sub(Out(S))σ . Since no term is deduced twice in D
′ by Lemma 4 this 
deduction must be a composition.
Let us prove D ′ is (T , σ ′)-localized. By definition of composition rules, every composition that de-
duces a term tσ ′ with t ∈ Sub(T ) \ Var(T ) has a left-hand side t1σ
′, . . . , tkσ
′ with t1, . . . , tk ∈ Sub(T )
and t1, . . . , tk → t is an instance of a composition rule. By the preceding paragraph every decomposi-
tion in D ′ occurs in D and thus by construction has its left-hand side in T1σ
′ which was previously 
built in D and is an instance of some Li → R i such that Sub(Li ∪ {R i}) ⊆ T1 ⊆ T .
Thus every deduction whose right-hand side is in (Sub(T ) \ Var(T ))σ ′ has its left-hand side in 
Sub(T )σ ′ , and thus D ′ is localized by T for σ ′ . ✷
4.3. One-to-one localization
We prove now that to solve constraint systems one can first guess equalities between terms in T
and then solve constraint systems without variables. The guess of equalities is correct with regard to 
a solution σ if terms in T that have the same instance by σ are syntactically equal. We characterize 
these guesses as follows.
Definition 4.2 (One-to-one localizations). A set of terms T one-to-one localizes a derivation D for a 
ground substitution σ if σ is injective on Sub(T ) and T localizes D for σ .
In the following sequence of Lemmas, we first prove in 6 and 7 routine properties of most general 
unifiers. They imply that from any unifier σ of a unification system U one can build a most general 
unifier θ such that θσ = σ and more importantly Sub(U)θ = Sub(Uθ). This property is employed 
in Lemma 8 to prove that once equalities between subterms are correctly guessed there exists a 
one-to-one localization of a maximal proof D whose size is linear (polynomial would have sufficed 
for our purpose) in the size of the input constraint system.
Lemma 6. Let T be a set of terms such that T = Sub(T ), σ be a ground substitution defined on Vars (T ), 
U = {p =? q : p,q ∈ T ∧ pσ = qσ } be a unification system and θ be its most general idempotent unifier with 
Vars (img (θ))⊆ Vars (U ). Then for any term t, tθσ = tσ .
Proof. Let us show that ∀x ∈ Vars (T ) , xσ = xθσ . Note that this trivially holds if xθ = x, and thus we 
consider the case xθ 6= x. Since U contains all equations p =? p for p ∈ Sub(T ) = T , we have Sub(T ) =
Sub(U ). From the idempotency of θ (∀y ∈ Vars (U ) , yθθ = yθ ), we get ∀y ∈ Vars (img (θ)) , yθ = y. As 
σ is evidently a unifier of U , there exists a substitution τ such that σ = θτ Therefore, yσ = yθτ =
yτ , i.e. yσ = yτ for all y ∈ Vars (img (θ)). Thus, for any x ∈ Vars (T ), xθσ = xθτ = xσ . Consequently, 
for any term t we have tσ = tθσ . ✷
The following lemma is important for the complexity analysis as it shows that guessing equalities 
between subterms and applying the mgu of the obtained unification system actually reduces the 
number of distinct subterms, and thus the DAG size of the constraint system
Lemma 7. Let U be a unification system and θ = mgu (U ) an idempotent most general unifier with 
Vars (img (θ))⊆ Vars (U ). Then for all t ∈ Sub(img (θ)) there exists u ∈ Sub(U ) such that t = uθ .
Proof. Assume there exists terms in Sub(img (θ)) that are not equal to the instance of a term in 
Sub(U ). Since this set is finite, let t be maximal among these terms for the subterm relation. If t is 
also maximal in Sub(img (θ)), then there exits x ∈ Vars (U ) such that xθ = t , a contradiction. Thus 
there exists a function symbol f and a term t′ = f (. . . , t, . . .) in Sub(img (θ)). By the maximality of 
t there exists u′ ∈ Sub(U ) such that u′θ = t . If u′ is not a variable, the syntactic equality implies 
that u′ = f (. . . , u, . . .) with uθ = t , again a contradiction. Thus there exists a variable u′ in Sub(U )
such that u′θ = f (. . . , t, . . .) = t′ . The standard procedure computing a solved form U ′ of a syntactic 
unification system U is such that Sub(U ′) ⊆ Sub(U ) (before variable identification), and the fact that 
u′θ is not a variable implies that U ′ contains an equation u′′ =? t
′′ with u′′θ = u′θ (the variables are 
identified in a subsequent step) and t′′ ∈ (Sub(U ′) \ Vars
(
U ′
)
) ⊆ (Sub(U ) \ Vars (U )). Thus there exists
t′′ ∈ (Sub(U ) \ Vars (U )) such that t′′θ = t′ . Since t′′ is not a variable, it contains a subterm u (also in 
Sub(U )) such that uθ = t . ✷
Lemma 8. Let S be a constraint system, σ be a ground substitution such that σ |= S .
Then there exists a set of terms T , a substitution τ of domain Var(T ) \ Var(S), a substitution θ and a 
(Sθ, σ )-compliant derivation D such that
• D is (T , σ ∪ τ )-maximal and one-to-one localized by T for σ ∪ τ
• σ ∪ τ = θ(σ ∪ τ )
• Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T
• T and θ are of size bounded by u × v × |Sub(S)| with u a fixed coefficient depending on how data are
represented, and v the size of the deduction system.
Proof. Under the same assumptions, by Lemma 5, there exists T0 ⊇ Sub(S) of size bounded by v ×
|Sub(S)|, with v the size of the deduction system, and τ of domain Var(T0) \ Var(S) such that there 
exists a (T0, σ ∪τ )-maximal and (S, σ )-compliant derivation D which is localized by T0 for the same 
substitution σ ′ = σ ∪ τ .
Let U =
{
t =? t
′ : t, t′ ∈ Sub(T0) and tσ
′ = t′σ ′
}
. The unification system U has a unifier σ ′ and
thus has a most general solution θ and by Lemma 6 we assume σ ′ = θσ ′ . Let T = Sub(T0)θ .
Since Sub(S) ⊆ T0 we have Sub(Sθ) ⊆ Sub(T0θ). Since θ is a most general unifier of U and 
Sub(U) = Sub(T0) we have Sub(T0θ) = Sub(T0)θ by Lemma 7. This implies (i) Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T , (ii) θ
is of size bounded by u1 × |Sub(T0)| and thus by u1 × v × |Sub(S)|, with u1 a fixed coefficient de-
pending on how substitutions are represented, and (iii) T is of size bounded by u × v × |Sub(S)|, 
with u > u1 a similar coefficient for substitutions and sets. The exact value is left to the reader. More-
over, as σ ′ = θσ ′ we have Sub(T )σ ′ = Sub(T0)σ
′ and thus from D is (T0, σ
′)-maximal follows D is 
(T , σ ′)-maximal.
Finally let us prove that D is one-to-one localized by T . By contradiction assume there exists 
t, t′ ∈ Sub(T ) such that tσ ′ = t′σ ′ but t 6= t′ . Since T = Sub(T0θ) there exists t0, t
′
0 ∈ Sub(T0) such that 
t0θ 6= t
′
0θ but t0θσ
′ = t′0θσ
′ . This contradicts either the definition of U or the definition of θ as one 
of its unifier.
From D is (S, σ )-compliant and σ = θσ we have D is (Sθ, σ )-compliant. ✷
4.4. Milestone sequence
In addition to retrace the deduction steps performed in D we want to track which terms relevant 
to S are deduced in T , and in which order.
Definition 4.3 (Milestone sequence). A milestone sequence ET is a finite sequence of annotated terms 
?t or → t . Let T be a set of terms, D = (li → ri)1≤i≤m be a derivation, and σ be a ground sub-
stitution injective on Sub(T ). A milestone sequence ET [1 : n] is the (T , σ )-milestone sequence of D
if there exists a strictly increasing function α : {1, . . . ,n} → {1, . . . ,m} such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n
we have:
(1) if ET [i] =?t then D[α(i)] =?tσ , and conversely if D[i] =?tσ then j ∈ img (α);
(2) if ET [i] =→ t then D[α(i)] = li → tσ is a standard deduction rule; Conversely if there exists
t ∈ Sub(T ) such that D[i] = li → tσ then i ∈ img (α).
We are now examining necessary and sufficient conditions on a sequence of terms to be a good 
milestone sequence of a derivation. Intuitively, we want to have guessed a feasible ordering on the 
terms, and thus the first step towards such a definition consists in defining places for terms in a 
milestone sequence.
Definition 4.4 (Positions in a milestone sequence). The position of a term t in a milestone sequence ET , 
denoted PosT (t) is either:
• ∞ if t does not occur in T ;
• or, if i is minimal such that ET [i] = ∗→ t , the number of non-standard deductions in ET [1 : i].
Given a term t /∈ X , we let Ät be the set of instances of deduction rules whose right-hand side
is t .
Definition 4.5 (Indices in a milestone sequence). The indice of a (non-ground) instance of a standard 
deduction rule t1, . . . , tn → t is denoted IndT (t1, . . . , tn → t) and is equal to max1≤i≤n(PosT (tn)). The 
indice is extended to non-standard deductions by setting IndT (?t)= PosT (t).
We can now define proper milestone sequences with regard to a set of terms T , i.e. sequences 
of terms that are candidates for being the milestone sequence of a (Sub(T ), σ )-maximal derivation. 
The two rules that have to be obeyed are (i) a term appearing as deduced in the sequence must be 
deducible and (ii) this deduction must be performed before the reception of any message. We express 
these conditions by comparing the position of a term t with the indices of rules in Ät . We add two 
other properties that will permit to have a tight relationship between proper milestone sequences 
and maximal derivations.
Definition 4.6 (Proper milestone sequence). Let T be a set of terms and ET be a sequence of ?t or → t , 
for t ∈ T . We say that ET is proper with regard to T if:
(1) For every t ∈ Sub(T ), mind∈Ät (IndT (d)) = PosT (t);
(2) For every indice i in ET , x ∈ Vars
(
ET [i]
)
implies there exists j ≤ x such that ET [ j] =→ x ;
(3) For every indice i such that ET [i] =?t and ∗→ t ∈ ET [1 : i − 1] either i = |ET | or ET [i + 1] =?t′ .
5. Deciding constraint systems
Instead of trying to find a solution σ of a constraint system S , we focus on its satisfiability by
giving a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of existence of a proper milestone sequence 
within certain bounds. Lemma 9 states that if a (T , σ ) maximal derivation D is one-to-one local-
ized by T for σ then the (T , σ ) milestone sequence of D is proper. In Theorem 1, this lemma is 
employed to prove that if a constraint system is satisfiable then there is a proper milestone se-
quence that can be connected to S . Thus guessing T , θ , and ET , all of size polynomially bounded 
wrt the size of the deduction system and of the constraint system and checking the properties 
of ET is complete. Then we prove in Lemma 10 that this algorithm is sound, i.e. that if a T , θ
and ET satisfy all the checks performed then there exists a (S, σ )-compliant derivation D which is 
(T , σ )-maximal and a proof of σ |= S . Finally, the termination of this algorithm is trivial since ev-
ery check is performed in time linear in the size of the constraint system and of the deduction 
system. Thus the satisfiability of constraint systems is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial 
time.
First let us proceed with the lemma essential to prove the completeness of our algorithm by 
constructing a proper milestone sequence from a maximal derivation.
Lemma 9. Let T be a set of terms, σ be a substitution, and D be a (T , σ )-maximal derivation which is one-to-
one localized by T for σ . Then the (T , σ ) milestone sequence of D is a proper milestone sequence with regard 
to T .
Proof. Given the maximal derivation D and since T one-to-one localizes D for σ , we construct the 
milestone sequence ET as follows. Let n be the sum of the number of non-standard deductions in D
and of the number of terms in Sub(T )σ deduced by a standard rule in D . We construct the partial 
strictly increasing surjective function α : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,n} and the milestone sequence ET as 
follows. The domain of α is the set of indices i such that either D[i] is a non-standard deduction 
rule or a standard deduction rule l → r with r ∈ Sub(T )σ . Since this domain is totally ordered and of 
size n, and α is strictly increasing into {1, . . . ,n}, it is uniquely defined and onto. For i ∈ Dom(β) we 
define:
• If D[i] is a standard deduction l → rσ with r ∈ Sub(T ), we set ET [α(i)] =→ r;
• If D[i] is a non-standard deduction rule ?rσ with r ∈ Sub(T ), we set ET [α(i)] =?r.
By construction, and using the (into) function α−1 , ET is the (T , σ )-milestone sequence of D .
Thus we just have to prove that ET is a proper milestone sequence. Let N be the number of 
non-standard rules in D , and i1, . . . , iN be the indices of these rules in D , and ki1σ , . . . , kiNσ (with 
ki j ∈ Sub(T ) for j = 1, . . . , N) be the messages received by these rules. Note that by construction all 
the indices i1, . . . , iM are in the domain of α.
Let us prove the different points independently.
Claim 1. For every t ∈ Sub(T ), mind∈Ät (IndT (d)) = PosT (t).
Proof of the claim. Since D is (T , σ )-maximal, for every t ∈ Sub(T ), tσ ∈ Der(RD(i)) (for some i ≤ |D|) 
if, and only if, tσ ∈ RD(NextD(i) − 1). For t ∈ Sub(T ) let jt be minimal such that tσ ∈ Der(RD( jt))
(with jt =∞ if tσ /∈ Der(RD(|D|))), and let Mt be maximal such that iMt ≤ jt . By construction every 
jt <∞ is in the domain of α, and since the latter is strictly increasing we have in this case:
α(iMt )≤ α( jt) < α(iMt+1)
whereas if jt =∞ the term tσ is not deduced in D , and thus by construction is not occurring labelled 
in ET .
Since D is one-to-one localized by T for the substitution σ , for each standard deduction l → tσ
with t ∈ Sub(T ) \X there exists t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(T ) such that t1σ , . . . , tnσ are deduced before tσ in D
and t1, . . . , tn → t is an instance of a standard deduction rule. Since α is increasing, by construction 
the terms t1, . . . , tn occur before t in ET . Thus for all t ∈ Sub(T ) we have PosT (t)≥ IndT (t).
Assume the subset H ⊆ Sub(T ) of terms t such that PosT (t) > IndT (t) is not empty. If this set 
contains a term of finite indice, let t ∈ H be such that it is minimal among the terms in H . Since t ∈ H , 
there exists an instance t1, . . . , tn → t of a deduction rule such that max1≤k≤n(PosT (tk)) < PosT (t), 
and thus for 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have α(itk ) < α(iMt ). Since α is increasing and into, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we 
have itk < iMt . Since t1σ , . . . , tnσ → tσ is a ground instance of a deduction rule, this contradicts that 
the minimal i such that tσ ∈ Der(RD(i)) is greater than or equal to iM , and thus this contradicts 
the maximality of D . Otherwise, if the H contains only terms of infinite positions, there exists an 
instance t1, . . . , tn → t of a deduction rule such that the maximum of PosT (tk) is finite, and thus 
t1, . . . , tk occur in ET , but PosT (t) is infinite, i.e. t does not occur in ET . By construction of ET this means 
that t1σ , . . . , tnσ ∈ RD(|D|), so since t1σ , . . . , tnσ → tσ is a ground instance of a standard deduction 
rule we must have tσ ∈ Der(RD(|D|)). Since D is maximal and tσ /∈ RD(|D|), we must also have 
tσ /∈ Der(RD(|D|)), a contradiction. Hence in all cases H must be empty, and thus, for all t ∈ Sub(T )
we have PosT (t)= IndT (t), and ET is a proper milestone sequence. ✸
Claim 2. For every indice i in ET , x ∈ Vars
(
ET [i]
)
implies there exists j ≤ x such that ET [ j] =→ x.
Proof of the claim. If x ∈ Vars
(
ET [i]
)
then there exists corresponding deduction D[ j] that deduces
term ET [i]σ . Then by Lemma 4 there exists k < j such that D[ j] deduces by a standard rule xσ ′ . From 
the injectivity of σ follows that x is the only term of Sub(T ) having σ image equal xσ . Thus, by 
definition of milestone sequence, there exists m < i such that ET [m] =→ x. ✸
Claim 3. For every indice i such that ET [i] =?t and PosT (t) < i either i = |ET | or ET [i + 1] =?t
′ .
Proof of the claim. Assume that i < |ET |, i.e. that ET [i +1] is defined. If ET [i +1] =→ s, then by construc-
tion we have D[α−1(i + 1)] = l → sσ , and thus sσ ∈ (Der(RD(i)) \ Der(RD(i − 1))). This contradicts 
PosT (t) < i, as the latter implies tσ ∈ Der(RD(i −1)) and thus Der(RD(i)) \Der(RD(i −1)) = ∅. ✸ ✷
Conversely, a maximal derivation can be build once given a proper milestone sequence.
Lemma 10. If ET is a proper milestone sequence for a set of terms T , and there is a substitution σ and a 
derivation D such that ET is the milestone sequence of D, then T one-to-one localizes D for σ , and D is 
(T , σ )-maximal.
Proof. For each t ∈ Sub(T ) \X such that there exists i with ET [i] =→ t , let lt be a set of terms such 
that, for each s ∈ lt , there exists j < i with ET [ j] =→ s or ET [ j] =?s. Assume ET contains N variables, 
i.e. modulo renamming Sub(T ) ∩X = {x1, . . . , xN }. For x ∈ Vars (T ) we let cx ∈ Cmed be a constant not
occurring elsewhere, and tx be either:
• If x ∈ Vars
(
ET
)
: the last received message before the deduction of x, or the nonce c0 if no such
term exists;
• Otherwise, a constant Secret no occurring in Sub(T ) nor in the rules of the deduction system
(and thus not in Cmed).
We let σ = {x 7→ f (cx, txσ )}x∈Sub(T )∩X . Note this substitution is well defined by the second prop-
erty of proper milestone sequences. We define the sequence of deductions D as follows:
D =→ c0,→ cx1 , . . . ,→ cxN , D ET
where the sequence D ET of deduction rules is defined by:
D ET [i] =


ltσ → tσ if ET [i] =→ t /∈X
cx, txσ → xσ if ET [i] =→ x ∈X
?tσ if ET [i] =?t
Given the constraint on f , σ maps variables to distinct ground values that cannot occur in 
(Sub(T ) \ X )σ . Thus, by construction, D is one-to-one localized by T for σ . Let us prove that D
is (T , σ ) maximal. To prove this, let t be an arbitrary term in Sub(T ), and let i be an indice in D .
• If tσ ∈ RD(NextD(i) − 1) then since D is a derivation and NextD(i) − 1 ≥ i, we have tσ ∈
Der(RD(i));
• Conversely, assume tσ ∈ Der(RD(i)). Let us prove that tσ ∈ RD(NextD(i) − 1). By contradiction
and wlog assume that i is minimal such that there exists t ∈ Sub(T ) such that tσ ∈ Der(RD(i))
but tσ /∈ RD(NextD(i) − 1).
· If t ∈ Vars
(
ET
)
, then by the second property of proper milestone sequences there exists j
with ET [ j] = t , jt maximal such that ET [ jt] =?s and jt ≤ j, and by construction tσ = f (ct , sσ ). 
Let D[α−1( jt)] =?sσ . Given the third property of proper milestone sequences, ∗→ s does 
not occur in ET [1 : α(i) − 1]. Thus by minimality of i we have ∗→ s /∈ ET [1 : jt − 1] implies 
sσ /∈ Der(RD(i − 1)). By construction if α(i) ≥ jt then in D we have tσ ∈ RD(NextD(i) − 1). 
If α(i) < jt , since no non-variable subterm of T is equal to tσ , by Lemma 4 the last deduction 
in a minimal derivation deducing tσ must be a composition, and thus sσ ∈ Der(RD(i − 1)), 
a contradiction.
· If t ∈ Vars (T ) \ Vars
(
ET
)
, since by construction there is no subterm of D that contains the
constant secret /∈ Cmed , tσ cannot be deduced from RD (|D|): by contradiction, one would 
consider the minimal indice m in a derivation deducing tσ such that secret occurs in the 
right-hand side of a rule. This would have to be a composition, which is impossible.
· If t ∈ Sub(T ) \X , we note that by definition of σ and since f does not occur in any decomposi-
tion rule, we have lσ → tσ if, and only if, l → t . Since ET is proper, we have IndT (t)= PosT (t),
and thus every deduction lσ → tσ is such that at least one term s ∈ l is deduced in D at a step
after i. ✷
We are now able to prove our main theorem which provides a sound and complete criterion for 
deciding whether a constraint system is satisfiable.
Theorem 1. A constraint system S is satisfiable if, and only if, there exists a set of terms T and a substitution 
θ both of sizes bounded by P (v, |Sub(S)|) with P some fixed polynom depending on the representation of 
data, such that Sub(S)θ ⊆ T , plus a proper milestone sequence ET and a strictly increasing mapping α such 
that:
(1) (Sθ)[i] =!t implies ET [α(i)] =?t and if ET [i] =?t then i is in the image of α;
(2) (Sθ)[i] =?t implies PosT (t)≤ PosT
(
ET [α(prevSθ (i))]
)
;
(3) (Sθ)[i] = ♮t implies PosT (t) > PosT
(
ET [α(prevSθ (i))]
)
.
Proof. If S is satisfiable then by Lemma 8 there exist T , σ , τ and θ as advertised by this lemma, and 
a (T , (σ ∪ τ ))-maximal (Sθ, σ )-compliant derivation D which is a proof of σ |= S and one-to-one 
localized by T for (σ ∪ τ ). Thus there exists a proper milestone sequence ET by Lemma 9. The fact 
that D is (S, σ )-compliant yields the first point. The facts that it is (T , σ ∪ τ )-maximal, one-to-one 
localized by T for (σ ∪ τ ) and that Sub(S)θ ⊆ T yields the second and third points. Note that the 
sizes of T and θ are already bounded thanks to Lemma 8.
Conversely, if there exists T , ET and θ as advertised, there exists by Lemma 10 one constructs from 
ET a substitution σ and a (T , σ )-maximal and (S, σ )-compliant derivation D . The properties of proper 
milestone sequences ensure that the conditions of Lemma 2 are met, and thus that D is a proof of 
σ |= S . ✷
From the previous result we can directly derive a trivial NP-decision procedure for constraint sys-
tems satisfiability: even if not formally computed here to avoid any dependency on the way data 
are represented in practice, the polynom P bounding the size of a set of terms is known and com-
putable as soon as the representations of data (substitutions, deduction system) are chosen. Assume 
v is the size of the deduction system. All we have to do is to: guess a set of terms of size lower than 
|Sub(S)| × v , a substitution θ of size bounded by P (v, |Sub(S)|), a milestone sequence ET of length 
less than or equal to |Sub(T )|, and check (in polynomial time) whether Sub(S) ⊆ Sub(T θ), whether 
ET is a proper milestone sequence with regard to T and has all the requisite properties from Theo-
rem 1, and whether there exists a function α mapping the terms sent in the constraint system to 
their θ -instance in ET . The NP-hardness is entailed by the NP-hardness of solving constraint systems 
without negative constraints (Rusinowitch and Turuani, 2003). Note that the deduction system, and 
thus its size v , is part of the input data for NP-completeness: the one shown for LOP in Section 2 was 
only an example.
6. Implementation and computer experiments
6.1. Solving negative constraints in Cl-Atse
Cl-Atse is a Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (Turuani, 2006) for security protocols and services 
specified in HLPSL (Chevalier et al., 2004) or ASLan languages (Armando et al., 2012). It runs the pro-
tocol or set of services along all possible traces and dynamically collects the constraints over terms 
and messages, over security properties, etc. Therefore, Cl-Atse’s engine is primarily a constraint solver, 
reducing them down to normal forms instead of bounding derivations. Cl-Atse only handles a special 
subterm theory modelling symmetric and asymmetric encryption, that we call here Dolev Yao theory. 
Since for our target examples Dolev Yao theory was sufficient we have preferred to adapt the exist-
ing procedure of Cl-Atse instead of directly implementing the general but highly inefficient decision 
procedure for negative constraints from previous section.
Let us recall the way the standard version of Cl-Atse works with positive constraints only. The tool 
splits a constraints system into sub-systems and reduces them, while preserving the set of solutions 
The main goal is to reduce sets of constraints systems such that in all the ?t constraints t is limited 
to be a variable and all the ! constraints are decomposed with regard to the new constraints that this 
may require. A system of this form is said reduced, and (without ♮ constraint) it is easily satisfiable 
by filling variables with fresh nonces created by the mediator at the start: all the ?X constraints can 
use them directly. This points out that once a reduced constraint (without ♮ constraint) system is 
reached, satisfiability is ensured by any assignment of the variables.
The tool has been extended with negative constraints (i.e. ♮) which serve as guards during the 
reduction. Preserving the process already working for positive constraints (i.e. ?), the tool does not 
reduce ♮ as it does for ?. Instead, it uses it to eliminate sub-systems that syntactically admit no 
solutions with regard to the negative constraints. Let CX be a set of fresh nonces generated by the 
intruder at the start, and let C ′
X
be a set of fresh nonces known by nobody (at the start of later). Let γ
be an injective substitution from X to CX ∪ C
′
X
such that V γ ⊆ CX with V = Vars (In(S)∪ Out(S)), 
i.e. any variable shown in at least one positive constraint get a value known by the intruder, and
(Vars (S) \ V )γ ⊆ C ′
X
i.e. any variable only shown in the negative constraints get a value unknown
to the intruder. We say that a constraint system S is contradictory iff there exists S1 , t and S2
such that S = S1.♮t.S2 and tγ ∈ Der(In(S1)γ ∪ Out(S1)γ ). The tool does not compute γ explic-
itly but simply consider variables like nonces for this test. The idea of this test is to: i) have a
fast, incomplete, test for eliminating obviously contradicting constraint systems each time a reduced
constraint system is reached: thanks to the Determination any solution must satisfy the negative
constraints at least syntactically; ii) see that on a reduced constraint system, this syntactic test is
sufficient to provide at least one solution: we know that γ|V : V → CX satisfies the positive con-
straints as would any solution filling variables with fresh nonces known only by the intruder at 
the beginning; but it also satisfies the negative ones by definition of a contradictory system. Note 
that this method to add negative constraints over an existing constraint solving technique only 
works if the constraint solving algorithm for positive-only constraints produces reduced systems of 
suitable type.
Finally, as pointed in i) this elimination test is fast: theoretically, the testing of Der modulo γ is 
a derivation test in the ground case, which is known to be polynomial and done by building a set 
of derivable subterms from which we can compose the target; however in practice, this ability is 
essential for reducing positive constraints, and already exists in the tool. For example, the purpose of 
decomposing the ! constraints as pointed above is precisely for collecting all the derivable subterms. 
This makes the test straightforward and limits the speed impact on the tool. Moreover, the tool does 
not reduce the whole constraint system at once: instead, it builds it by successively adding new 
constraints and reducing the intermediate result, e.g. each time a choice is done on the next protocol 
step to follow. Therefore, the contradicting negative constraints are eliminated progressively, at each 
step. In the end, the processing of ♮ has not a large impact on Cl-Atse computation time.
6.2. Integration in AVANTSSAR’s orchestrator
The AVANTSSAR Orchestrator3 (Armando et al., 2012) is a tool built over Cl-Atse for automatic 
orchestration of web services along with their security policies. The orchestration problem in this 
context can be reduced to a protocol state reachability problem, which in turn can be converted 
3 Available online at https :/ /cassis .loria .fr /OrchestratorWI/.
into a classical protocol insecurity problem where the adversary plays the role of a mediator. The 
transformation can be described as follows: The available web services are mapped in a one-to-
one fashion to security protocol parties (roles); since services and roles are both represented by 
sequences of message receptions and sends this transformation is straightforward (see details and 
examples in public Deliverable 4.2 at www.avantssar.eu). The Client in the orchestration problem 
is specified too as a sequence of message receptions and sends and therefore can be translated 
directly to a security protocol role also called Client. This role is then extended by a last step 
where it sends a special token End_execution_client signalling that the Client has successfully fin-
ished its execution. Now, given the derived protocol parties (corresponding to the available web 
services and the client) we ask, whether the intruder can learn that special token issued by the 
Client, i.e. whether the intruder knows that token at some point of some protocol execution (in-
security goal). All the non-disclosure policies are added to the insecurity goal. Thus, the protocol 
insecurity problem can now be stated in form: is there a protocol execution in presence of an 
intruder, such that this intruder learns the token issued by the Client at the end, without being 
able to infer the other messages stated in the non-disclosure policies? If such an execution exists, 
the actions of the intruder in this execution can be translated back to a Mediator service satisfy-
ing both the Client communication requirements and all the non-disclosure policies. The relevant 
execution can be found by the Cl-Atse procedure for solving negative constraints as described in 
Subsection 6.1.
In practice, the AVANTSSAR Orchestrator also relies on the ASLan specification language for web 
services created for AVANTSSAR platform, a translation tool dedicated to ASLan, and an analysis back-
end (possibly Cl-Atse) for validating the composed specification produced. Negative constraints have 
been integrated, which now supports an extended variant of the ASLan language with negative con-
straints of the form not(iknows(t)), where: t is a term; iknows(t) is a constraint requiring that t is 
deducible by the intruder at the moment when the transition containing it is run; and not(iknows(t))
is the negation of this, i.e. there must not exist any sequence of intruder deduction rules capable of 
producing t at that time.
6.3. Experiments
The LOP motivating example from Section 2, which is inspired by the Loan Origination case study 
from AVANTSSAR, has already been described in Section 2 and requires non-deductibility constraints. 
Therefore, it is up to the AVANTSSAR’s Orchestrator to generate a non-trivial mediator that is unable 
to deduce, i.e. even through calculations and beyond simple eavesdropping, the client’s private data 
and is unable to invalidate the security policy of any agent involved in the exchange.
In the standard AVANTSSAR framework, it was not possible to express directly non-disclosure poli-
cies nor separation-of-duty policies. This gets now possible thanks to the introduction of negative 
constraints in both Cl-Atse and AVANTSSAR’s Orchestrator. For example, the client model in ASLan++
before this extension, i.e. without any negative constraints, is the following:
1. entity Client(Actor, Pep, M: agent, Amount: text) {
2. symbols
3. Ephemeral_key : symmetric_key;
4. Resp_A, Resp_B, End_execution_client : text;
5. A, B : agent;
6. body {
7. Actor -> M : {g(Actor).loan.Pep}_inv(pk(Actor));
8. M -> Actor : ?A.?B;
9. Ephemeral_key := fresh();
10. Actor -> M : {Amount.Actor.Ephemeral_key}_pk(A).
11. {Amount.Actor.Ephemeral_key}_pk(B);
12. M -> Actor : {h(A.Amount.Actor.?Resp_A)}_inv(pk(A)).
13. {h(B.Amount.Actor.?Resp_B)}_inv(pk(B)).
14. {|?Resp_A|}_Ephemeral_key.
15. {|?Resp_B|}_Ephemeral_key;
19. secrecy_End_of_execution:(End_execution_client) := fresh();
20. Actor -> Pep: {Amount.Actor.A.Resp_A.B.Resp_B}_pk(Pep).
21. {h(A.Amount.Actor.Resp_A)}_inv(pk(A)).
22. {h(B.Amount.Actor.Resp_B)}_inv(pk(B)).
23. End_execution_client;
24. }}
The ASLan++ term notation matches the one in this paper (e.g. {|M|}_K} is {|M|}K ), except that 
?A designates the new value of A in the current action (probably a reception but not only) instead of 
just the action that receives it. In here, the client played by agent Actor communicates with his bank 
Pep and the mediator M from which he receives tho clerk’s names A and B (at line 8) after sending 
his loan examination request (at line 7). Then, he encrypts and sends his private loan data, simplified 
here to the amount itself, for the clerks through the mediator (at lines 10 and 11). In return, he 
expects signed responses protected by his fresh ephemeral key (at lines 12 to 15), which can then be 
used to contact the loan provider Pep (at lines 20 to 22). The sending of token End_execution_client
defines the client’s success (at lines 23). Once translated to ASLan using the AVANTSSAR’s Aslanpp 
connector, this role definition can be extended with new guards:
16. not(iknows(Amount));
17. not(iknows(Resp_A));
18. not(iknows(Resp_B));
ensuring that the client won’t successfully terminate the run by sending End_execution_client if the 
intruder (playing the mediator M) is capable to build or deduce the loan’s amount or any of the clerk’s 
private response. Similarly, the clerk’s ASLan model is extended with negative constraints encoding 
separation of duty with the following idea: i) Any honest agent A taking a role in the process sends 
a g(A) token to the mediator, like e.g. g(Actor) at the client’s line 7; ii) Relationships between agents 
are modeled through encryptions known by the mediator, like e.g. {g(C)}g(B) if C is linked to B , and 
vice versa; iii) when a new agent C is selected to be a clerk, a negative constraint not(g(C)) ensures 
that there exists no chain of relationships of any length that could link him to some agent already 
involved in the exchange.
As a result, we can show the effects of negative constraints in this application by experimenting 
variants of the model where the mediator is, or is not, restricted by negative constraints and where 
clerks are, or are not, available to the mediator:
(1) Without the negative constraints, and with or without any clerk, the Orchestrator finds a mediator
that assumes himself the role of a clerk, which is precisely the behaviour we want to avoid since
further analysis will necessary reject it. This shows that if allowed to, the mediator really has the
knowledge needed to act as a clerk.
(2) With the negative constraints, but without any clerk, the Orchestrator does not find any valid
orchestration. This is logical since without any external agent playing as a clerk, and with
constraints like not(iknows(Amount)) preventing the mediator from being able to deduce the
loan Amount, and thus, from being a clerk himself, it is impossible to satisfy the client’s re-
quest.
(3) With both the negative constraints and the clerks being available, the Orchestrator finds a good
orchestration, i.e. one where all the security policies of all agents are satisfied in any trace.
There, as expected the mediator delegates some parts of the process to the clerks, which ap-
pears to be a needed condition for the secret data to remain secret and non-deducible by the
mediator.
For example, assume that the mediator’s initial knowledge contains a client name client, three 
clerks’s names alice, bob and charlie, an entry for bob and charlie in the relational database (i.e. 
rel(g(bob), g(charlie))), and the methods to communicate with these agents, then as expected in the 
point (3) above the complete specification of LOP in our setting allow the tool to produce a (new) 
mediator entity for this form:
1. entity Mediator(M : agent) {
2. symbols
3. Loan, Req1, Req2, HResp1a, HResp1b, HResp2a, HResp2b : message;
4. Pep : agent;
5. body {
6. M -> alice : request.M
7. alice -> M : g(alice).pk(alice) % Cannot create g(alice) before
8. M -> bob : request.M
9. bob -> M : g( bob ).pk( bob ) % Cannot create g( bob ) before
10. client -> M: {g(client).?Loan.?Pep}_inv(pk(client))
11. M -> client: alice.bob
12. client -> M: ?Req1.?Req2
13. M -> alice : Req1
14. alice -> M : {?HResp1a}_inv(pk(alice)).?HResp1b % Cannot create before
15. M -> bob : Req2
16. bob -> M : {?HResp2a}_inv(pk( bob )).?HResp2b % Cannot create before
17. M -> client: {HResp1a}_inv(pk(alice)).HResp1b.
18. {HResp2a}_inv(pk(alice)).HResp2b
19. % Cannot create: alice’s and bob’s Resp, client’s Amount.
20. }}
7. Conclusion
We have obtained the first decision procedure for deducibility constraints with negation and we 
have applied it to the synthesis of mediators subject to non-disclosure policies. It has been imple-
mented as an extension of Cl-Atse (Turuani, 2006) for the Dolev-Yao deduction system. On the Loan 
Origination case study, the prototype generates directly the expected orchestration. Without negative 
constraints undesired solutions in which the mediator impersonates the clerks were found. More de-
tails, including problem specifications, can be found at http :/ /cassis .loria .fr /Cl-Atse. As in Abadi and 
Cortier, Baudet (2006, 2005) our definition of subterm deduction systems can be extended to al-
low ground terms in right-hand sides of decomposition rules even when they are not subterms of 
left-hand sides and the decidability result remains valid with minor adaptation of the proof. A more 
challenging extension would be to consider general constraints (as in Avanesov et al. (2011)) with 
negation.
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